Skip to content

Preview

The “BRICs” concept was launched as a financial sector grouping of the then-major emerging market economies which were expected to grow faster than the “Group of Seven” or G7 economies.1 The thesis was that as the BRICs economies grew quickly over the decade to 2001, their impact on the global economy and their fiscal policy would become increasingly important.2 The leaders of the BRIC countries liked the idea, so the first formal BRIC ministerial meeting was held in 2006 at the margins of the UN General Assembly session in New York.

The group is not a formal multilateral organization like the United Nations (UN), World Bank or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There are no permanent officers, nor is there a head office. The heads of state and government of the member nations convene annually, with each nation taking up a one-year rotating chairmanship of the group. All the BRICS are already members of the G20, which also includes the G7 countries. In 2010, South Africa was invited to join the original BRIC group, and five more countries joined in January 2024: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

In this paper, we look at the recent developments within the emerging market countries known as “BRICs+,” and the implications for investors.

Key takeaways:

  • The loose grouping known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has demonstrated a higher degree of geopolitical ambition and doubled in size this year by accepting five new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]).
  • The composition of “BRICS+,” its increased scale and the inclusion of heavily sanctioned regimes make it look like an explicitly anti-G7 grouping with potential to disrupt global economic activity.
  • The factors mentioned above raise investor concerns around the ability of these countries to undermine the role of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency, but the situation is complicated.
  • There should be no doubt that the BRICS+ group aims to undermine the dominance of the US dollar, but the degree of commitment varies between Russia, Iran and China’s ambition, and the less-committed countries such as India and the UAE, where the preference is for their own currencies to take a bigger share. For Brazil and South Africa, settling trade with their biggest partner (China) in renminbi (RMB) is sufficient for now.
  • The group’s combined fossil fuel production is equal to approximately 40% of global oil production, but because China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia are also big consumers, BRICS+ represents 22%3 of the world’s export market volumes.
  • The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) as an alternative lender to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) affiliates suggests a desire to supplant the established multilateral institutions.
  • The creation of alternative financial transactions platforms is at least partly aimed at insulating these countries from potential financial sanctions in future.
  • It seems prudent to assume that these efforts continue to gain traction, effectively ringfencing economies from the established “Western” financial ecosystem of Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), as well as an attempt to use alternative currencies for intra-BRICS+ trade, other than the US dollar.
  • Investors have a fiduciary duty to regularly re-evaluate the possibility that this trajectory eventually leads to a reduced appetite globally for US Treasury bonds, while the likelihood remains extremely low at present.
  • These are the principal signposts for investors to watch for:
    • The development of alternative “financial plumbing” systems like Cross-Border International Settlement System (CIPS)
    • The level of acceptance of the RMB in intra-BRICS+ trade
    • The evolution of cross-border wholesale central bank digital currency (CBDC) projects like mBridge, which connects China, Thailand, the UAE and Hong Kong, and is expected to expand to 11 countries this year.4 This will be the real test case for a potential replacement of SWIFT in future.
  • Ultimately, we see the US dollar remaining the preferred global reserve currency in the foreseeable future. Even as other currencies increase their participation in foreign reserves, trade invoicing and transactions, incumbency, liquidity, efficiency and confidence in the dollar mean none can likely challenge it in the medium term.


IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

This material is provided for general informational purposes only and should not be considered individualized investment advice, a recommendation or a solicitation to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax advice. Franklin Templeton accepts no liability for losses arising from use of this material.

The views expressed are those of the investment manager as of the publication date and may change without notice. These opinions and analyses are based on certain assumptions, including market conditions that may change. They may differ from those of other portfolio managers or from the firm as a whole.

This material is not intended to provide a complete analysis of all material facts regarding any country, region or market. No assurance can be given that any forecast, projection or prediction regarding economies or financial markets will be realized. References to specific securities are for illustrative purposes only and should not be interpreted as recommendations or a solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security.

Any research or analysis in this material has been prepared by Franklin Templeton for its own purposes and is provided incidentally. While the information included is believed to be reliable, its accuracy and completeness cannot be guaranteed, and it is subject to change without notice.

Past performance does not guarantee future results, or any profit or gain. All investments involve risks, including possible loss of principal.

Franklin Templeton offers environmental, social and governance (ESG) capabilities, though not all strategies or products incorporate ESG as part of the investment process.

Investment strategies and services may not be available in all jurisdictions. Please consult your financial professional or Franklin Templeton contact for further information.

Brazil: Issued by Franklin Templeton Brasil Ltda. Canada: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments Corp. Offshore Americas: In the United States, this publication is made available by Franklin Templeton. United States: Issued by Franklin Templeton. Investments are not FDIC insured; may lose value; and are not bank guaranteed.

Europe: Issued by Franklin Templeton International Services S.à r.l., 8A, rue Albert Borschette, L-1246 Luxembourg. Poland: Issued by Templeton Asset Management (Poland) TFI S.A.; Rondo ONZ 1; 00-124 Warsaw.  Saudi Arabia: Issued by Franklin Templeton Financial Company, 13512 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Regulated by CMA. License no. 23265-22. South Africa: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments SA (PTY) Limited, which is authorised by the FSCA as a Financial Service Provider (No.44475). Switzerland: Issued by Franklin Templeton Switzerland Ltd, Talstrasse 41, CH-8001 Zurich. Middle East & Africa (ex South Africa): Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments (ME) Limited, which is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Address: Franklin Templeton, The Gate, East Wing, Level 2, Dubai International Financial Centre, P.O. Box 506613, Dubai, U.A.E. Tel: +971(04) 428 4100. United Kingdom: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Management Limited (FTIML), registered office: Cannon Place, 78 Cannon Street, London EC4N 6HL.

Australia: Issued by Franklin Templeton Australia Limited (ABN 76 004 835 849) (Australian Financial Services License Holder No. 240827), Level 47, 120 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3000. Hong Kong: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investments (Asia) Limited. Japan: Issued by Franklin Templeton Japan Co., Ltd. South Korea: Issued by Franklin Templeton Investment Advisors Korea Co., Ltd. Malaysia: Issued by Franklin Templeton Asset Management (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. & Franklin Templeton GSC Asset Management Sdn. Bhd. Singapore: Issued by Templeton Asset Management Ltd. (UEN) 199205211E. 2 Central Boulevard, IOI Central Boulevard Towers, West Tower #34-01, Singapore 018916.

Access your local website at www.franklinresources.com/all-sites.

CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are trademarks owned by CFA Institute.

Copyright © 2026 Franklin Templeton. All rights reserved.